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ii

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT RECOGNIZED THERE
WERE DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AT THE
TIME OF HEARING ORAL ARGUMENTS ON
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Record Made As To Disputed Facts. The trial court at the time of hearing oral
arguments on January 21, 1998 on the Motion for Summary Judgment made a record of the
disputed facts. The trial court stated we are all aware "that issues of fact become pretty critical
in a Motion for Summary Judgment". (1/21/98 TR. at 4). The trial judge acknowledged he had
read Rick Krambule's recitation of facts and Barbara Krambule's recitation of facts. (1/21/98
TR. at 4). The trial judge recited areas of concern to him to see if for the record, a stipulation
could be reached relative to the facts before hearing arguments on the motion for summary
judgment. (1/21/98 TR. at 5).
The trial judge indicated five areas of concern regarding the facts of the case. (1/21/98
TR. at 5-6). The first area of concern was whether the party separated and reconciled in 1989
and then entered into a second contract on July 18, 1990 for artificial insemination for the
second child. The parties agreed and stipulated to those facts. (1/21/98 TR. at 6).
The second area of concern to the trial court was whether the parties were seeing each
other socially during the summer of 1991. The parties agreed that was a disputed fact. (1/21/98
TR. at 6).
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The third area of concern to the trial judge was whether plaintiff, Rick Krambule knew
that Barbara Krambule was involved in artificial insemination treatment during the summer of
1991. The court asked if that fact was agreed, and the response was it was disputed. (1/21/98
TR.at 6, 7).
The fourth area of concern to the trial court was whether the defendant, Barbara
Krambule was being treated at St. Benedicts Hospital for emotional and mental problems in
December 1991. (1/21/98 TR. at 7). The parties stipulated that fact was generally correct, but
maybe not complete in the sense of the nature of the treatment she received. (1/21/98 TR. at 8).
The final area of concern to the court was whether the parties agreed that Barbara
Krambule did not pursue paternity after Matthew was born on March 24, 1992, because Rick
Krambule always promised to do what was right for Matthew in the future. The parties agreed
that fact was disputed. (1/21/98 TR. at 10). With that understanding as to the facts, the court
then invited the parties to present their arguments. (1/21/98 TR. at 10).
Deposition Published. The trial court ordered the deposition of Barbara Krambule to
be published at the conclusion of the hearing for Summary Judgment. In her deposition,
Barbara Krambule acknowledged Rick Krambule did not receive notice from her of her
continuing efforts to become pregnant by artificial insemination. (Barbara Krambule's
Deposition pg.19). Barbara Krambule also testified to her knowledge she did not know if Rick
Krambule received notice from anyone else that she was attempting to become pregnant by
insemination after their separation. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition pg. 19). This testimony
by Barbara Krambule is contradictory from that argued at the motion for summary judgment
and in her appeal brief. (Appellee's Brief pg. 17).
2

Barbara Krambule's testimony at her deposition is also contradictory concerning
payment of the medical bills incurred by her at the University Medical Center. She claims in
her appeal brief Rick Krambule received the medical bills after the parties separated so he must
have known she was undergoing artificial insemination procedures. (Appellee's Brief, pg. 17)
However, on cross examination she admitted they separated near the end of April, 1991 or first
of May, 1991 and that she remained at the family home; that she alone paid the medical bills to
the University Medical Center; and that she does not know if he saw the medical bills or not.
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition pg. 47).
Rick Krambule filed an Affidavit after he was served with Barbara Krambule's Petition
to Modify disputing he was the father of Matthew ( R at pg. 90). In paragraphs 17 and 19 of
Rick Krambule's Affidavit he stated he did not consent to the artificial insemination of Barbara
Krambule resulting in the conception of Matthew Krambule. ( R at pg. 94 and 95).
In this case the record indicates there exists a genuine issue as to material facts
precluding the grant of summary judgment to Barbara Krambule pursuant to Rule 56(c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment,
appellate courts shall view the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield vs. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989)
No Affidavit By Moving Party. Barbara Krambule, the moving party, failed to submit an
Affidavit in support of her motion for summary judgment. She argues from facts based on her
own contradictory deposition. In her deposition, she acknowledges she did not advise Rick
Krambule of her efforts to be inseminated nor does she know of anyone who did. (Barbara
Krambule's Deposition pg. 19). However, in her brief she alleges Rick Krambule knew of her
3

continuing the artificial insemination procedures and that she could get pregnant because of a
letter he had written. (Appellee's brief pg. 9, 17).
Barbara Krambule has not supported her motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56(c), U.R.C.P. She cannot rely upon a contradictory deposition to create a material fact. When
read in light of Rule 56(b) URCP, it is clear that the Subdivision (e) requirement that a party
opposing the summary judgment motion file counter affidavits applies only when the moving
party has elected to and has filed affidavits in support of their own motion. If the moving party
chooses not to or simply fails to file affidavits, Subdivision (e) is inapplicable. Gadd vs. Olson.
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984).
Barbara Krambule has failed to adequately support her own motion for summary
judgment and is not entitled to a grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, the record reflects
the existence of material issues of fact concerning Barbara Krambule continuing with artificial
insemination after separation of the parties and the legal effect of that under the insemination
contract.

II
APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE FROM
AN APPEAL GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Appellant, Rick Krambule appeals both the Order Granting Summary Judgment to
Barbara Krambule as well as its supporting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together
4

with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Modified Decree of Divorce entered by
the trial court. The essential facts regarding paternity of Mathew on which the trial court relied
upon at the second hearing in determining child support and related issues, were adduced at the
first hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
In Finding of Fact 4 in support of the Order Granting Summary Judgment the trial court
held it must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine the legal
obligation of the parties involved. In Findings of Fact 5 the trial court found the parties entered
into a contract on July 18, 1990 entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures To Achieve
Pregnancy Through Artificial Insemination of Donor Semen and that this contract obligated
Rick Krambule to assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial
insemination. In Finding of Fact 7 the trial court found in order for this contract to be null and
void an event must occur which would terminate the contract. The court found a divorce could
have terminated the contract but since the child was conceived during the marriage and prior to
the divorce being granted the contract was not terminated. In Finding of Fact 8 the trial court
found strong public policy protects the interest of a minor child and that separation of the
parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and that only a divorce obtained prior to the
conception of the child was sufficient to repudiate the contract.
The findings of the trial court from the first hearing regard Barbara Krambule's Motion
for Summary Judgment were incorporated in Finding of Fact 8 in support of the Modified
Decree of Divorce. The issue of Rick Krambule being the legal father of Matthew was not
litigated at the second hearing on April 30 and May 1, 1998 as the trial court had already so
ruled.
5

On appeal, Appellant, Rick Krambule, is entitled to have the facts and reasonable
inferences drawn from them viewed in a light most favorable to him. He is not required to
marshal all the evidence against him establishing paternity when appealing a grant of summary
judgment. If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning a question of fact, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Wilkinson vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (359 Utah
Adv, Rep. 57).

Ill
THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
CONTRACT EXPRESSES AN INTENT
THAT BOTH PARTIES FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
PROCEDURES WAS VOLUNTARY AND BOTH
PARTIES DESIRE TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY
Barbara Krambule argues she and Rick Krambule signed the artificial insemination
contract on July 18, 1990 which made him financially responsible to support Matthew. She
argues the contract is legal and binding and he should not try to avoid his responsibilities as set
forth in paragraph 10 of the contract.
The meaning and effect to be given a contract depends upon the intent of the parties.
Contracts are to be construed in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced
by the purpose and language of the contract. Debry vs. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav., 754 P.2d
60, 62 (Utah 1988). A reading of the artificial insemination contract indicates both parties as
husband and wife must have a continuing intent to achieve pregnancy and both acknowledge
their participation in future artificial insemination procedures shall be voluntary.
Paragraph 1 of the contract states "we, as husband and wife, acknowledge that we have
6

been unable to achieve a pregnancy because of one or more of the following conditions, not
withstanding thorough evaluation and therapy....
Paragraph 2 states we hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and request that
artificial insemination procedures be utilized in an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with
semen obtained from an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s)....
Paragraph 8. We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial procedure(s) is
voluntary.
Paragraph 8 underscores an intent of the parties that any future participation by both
parties in artificial insemination procedures is acknowledged to be voluntary. To act voluntary in
a matter means a wilful, deliberate choice is made. In order to act voluntary Rick Krambule must
have knowledge of Barbara Krambule's continued efforts to achieve pregnancy by artificial
insemination. Both parties were aware the other's continued participation in future insemination
procedures was intended to be voluntary. For one party to conceal efforts to become inseminated
is deceitful and fraudulent.
Paragraph 2 emphasizes both parties jointly affirm a desire to achieve pregnancy and
artificial insemination procedures be utilized to achieve pregnancy. The intent of the parties was
that both must have a continuing desire to achieve pregnancy.
The trial court's interpretation of the contract in this case does not accurately reflect the
intent of the parties. A reasonable interpretation of the contract is that both parties must desire to
achieve a pregnancy as husband and wife, consent to ongoing artificial insemination procedures,
and act voluntarily in regard to future participation in artificial insemination procedures. The
trial court restricted its interpretation of the contract as to whether Rick Krambule was finally
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divorced before Matthew was conceived and whether Rick Krambule expressly notified the
University Medical Center of cancellation of the agreement.
In a dialogue with the trial judge at the time of hearing oral arguments on the motion for
summary judgment, the trial judge questioned the effect of the parties' separation. (1/21/98 Tr. at
46) Should that separation, ipso facto, make this contract with the University Hospital void?
Or, must either of the parties take steps to negate the contact, repudiate the contract, and let the
other side who entered into this contract, namely the University and the medical people know?
(1/21/98 Tr. at 46) Or, if they separate, do you just say that in and of itself negates this
particular agreement? Or is it fact specific? The intent of the party prevails. (1/21/98 Tr. at 46)
The trial judge compared the insemination contract to a will. (1/21/98 Tr. at 46). When
parties divorce each other that negates a will. (1/21/98 Tr. at 46). However, separation alone
does not negate a will. (1/21/98 Tr. at 47). A will has to be repudiated, torn up, destroyed to be
negated. (1/21/98 Tr. at 47) If you sign an agreement like this artificial insemination contract, is
that analogous to a will? (1/21/98 Tr. at 47). The trial court stated in the context of this case, the
only way the court would be persuaded that Rick Krambule does not have the legal obligation to
support Mathew is if in fact a divorce had occurred prior to conception. (1/21/98 Tr. at 65)
Appellant argues the insemination contract should be interpreted according to the intent of the
parties. Rick Krambule should be entitled to a trial on the merits to determine the purpose of the
contract and examine the intent of the parties and their reasonable expectations.
Appellant contends the insemination contract should not be viewed as a will. It is a
contract which can be modified, it is capable of interpretation and should be enforced to
effectuate the purpose, intent and expectations of the parties. A trial on the merits would permit

8

the parties to present those facts and issues to the court. It is submitted the trial court should not
have ruled as a matter of law on its interpretation of the insemination contract without hearing all
of the evidence.
Paragraph 13 of contract. Respondent Barbara Krambule cites paragraph 13 of the
artificial insemination contract for the proposition it precludes both parties from denying their
responsibility for Matthew. Barbara Krambule's reliance on paragraph 13 is misplaced.
Paragraph 13 states as follows:

We agree, individually and severely, that neither of
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid
or abet in any way, any person, including any child
or offspring in initiating or pursuing any claim or
legal proceeding with respect to any matter arising
out of, or resulting from the artificial insemination
procedure(s) authorized herein.

Paragraph 13 is intended to preclude the parties from suing doctors and hospitals for
complications, birth defects or injuries to the child born as of the result of artificial insemination
procedures. Paragraph 13 has no application to these proceedings.
Lord Mansfield's Rule. Respondent, Barbara Krambule, argues that because Matthew
was born prior to the parties divorce becoming final, there is a presumption that Petitioner, Rick
Krambule, is the father. She argues a child born in wedlock is presumed to be the husband's
child and that while this presumption can be rebutted it cannot be rebutted by the testimony of
the parents. This is commonly referred to as Lord Mansfield's Rule. This issue was expressly
addressed by the trial judge at the hearing for Summary Judgment.
Petitioner, Rick D. Krambule, filed a Motion for an order requiring blood tests on or
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about July 22, 1997. The trial court, prior to hearing oral arguments for the Motion for Summary
Judgment addressed the parties stating, "there were two motions pending before the court, one
being Petitioner's Motion for Blood Test and the other being cross motions for Summary
Judgment". (1/21/98 TR. at 2).
The trial court stated, "it seemed to him that given the memoranda for Summary
Judgment that the parties have almost agreed there is no biological paternity" on the part of Rick
Krambule. Barbara Krambule's attorney agreed with the trial judge. (1/21/98 TR. at 2, 3).
Counsel for both parties agreed that Petitioner's Motion for a Blood Test was therefore moot
(1/21/99 TR. at 3). In Finding of Fact 3 in support of the Order Granting Summary Judgment the
trial court specifically found Rick Krambule was not the biological father of the minor child,
Matthew.
In Barbara Krambule's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment dated October 31,1997,

( R at 247), she admitted to a statement of facts that she was

artificially inseminated by her physician at the University of Utah on June 24, 1991, the date of
conception. Respondent further admitted that medical records at the University of Utah indicated
Rick Krambule was sterile and Respondent, Barbara R. Krambule was inseminated with a sperm
donor other than Rick Krambule. Respondent further admitted that plaintiff, Rick Krambule had
previously been determined to be sterile by his physician, Dr. Bruce Carlin. In effect,
Respondent acknowledged testimony from third parties which proved beyond a reasonable doubt
Rick Krambule was not the biological father of Matthew.
The trial judge stated in terms of Lord Mansfield's Rule there is clear evidence
independent of either parent, Rick Krambule is not the biological father. (1/21/98 Tr. at 17)
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Counsel for Barbara Krambule then stated "but we are not relying on that". (1/21/98 Tr. at 17)
Given the stipulation of Respondent's counsel on record on January 21, 1998 prior to arguing the
motion for summary judgment and Respondent's admissions in the pleadings as to what
scientific evidence would show, Barbara Krambule cannot now argue that a presumption of
paternity applies in this case.

IV.
THE ISSUE OF INTENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION CONTRACT HAS BEEN PRESERVED
FOR APPEAL
Respondent, Barbara Krambule argues in her brief no mention of the intent of the
parties nor the interpretation of the artificial insemination contract was made in Appellant's
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, nor was the issue raised at the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment on January 21, 1998. That assertion is erroneous.
The trial judge acknowledged Rick Krambule was not the biological father of Matthew
but questioned whether Rick Krambule took steps to repudiate the contract. (1/21/98 TR. at 38).
It was argued Rick Krambule after separation did not consent to Barbara Krambule's efforts to
achieve pregnancy and to the ongoing artificial insemination procedures. (1/21/98 TR at 39).
The argument was made to the trial court at what point does the contract not achieve the purpose
for which it was intended. (1/21/98 TR at 39). At some point, someone has to say consent to
achieve pregnancy has not been given due to the fact the parties are separated. (1/21/98 TR. at
39). The point was made to the court the contract refers to the parties as husband and wife.
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Counsel for Rick Krambule argued the intent of the contract was in contemplation the parties
remain in a stable relationship and they both must desire to have a child. (1/21/98 at 39, 40).
It was argued it was not the intent of these parties when they signed this contract on July
18, 1990 to be bound forever. That time and circumstances could change when Rick Krambule
did not consent. (1/21/98 TR.at 41, 42). It was argued Rick Krambule had no knowledge that
Barbara Krambule continued with the artificial insemination procedures after their separation and
he had no control over her actions. (1/21/98 TR. at 42). It was further argued that it was illogical
to even think that Barbara Krambule would continue with artificial insemination after separation.
(1/21/98 Tr. at 48)
The trial court stated it had read the contract and there was nothing in the contract that
indicates what if the parties separate or divorce. (1/21/98 Tr. at 26) The trial court obviously
struggled with interpreting the contract and how to apply it to the facts of this case. The trial
court commented if Rick Krambule separates from Barbara Krambule does that automatically
negate his consent or must there be something more firm like a legal divorce. The trial court also
questioned out loud "if the intent of the parties prevails" in this case and therefore the contract
must be interpreted "fact specific". (1/21/98 Tr. at 46)
On appeal, the appellate court is free to interpret the artificial insemination contract to
determine if Barbara Krambule was entitled to summary judgment declaring Rick Krambule to
be the legal father of Matthew. It is submitted the court cannot rule as a matter of law on the
issue of paternity based solely on the contract and that a trial is necessary to construe this contract
in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the purpose and language of
the contract.
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Without specific knowledge of Barbara Krambule's continued efforts to become pregnant
after the parties' separated, Rick Krambule has not voluntarily participated in future artificial
insemination procedures. It is not possible to consent to an act without knowledge it is occurring
or shall take place in the future. In this case, Barbara Krambule owed Rick Krambule a duty of
good faith and fair dealing and should have advised him of her continued participation in the
artificial insemination procedures after their separation.
When one party to a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it
must exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith. Compliance with the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing depends upon the agreed purpose and justified expectations of the
parties. Good faith and fair dealing are facts sensitive concepts and whether there is a breach of
good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of
law, Cook vs. Zion's First National Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 60, 61 (Utah App. 1996).
The Contract requires ongoing, not just initial consent. The artificial insemination
contract should be construed as an agreement between the parties and not as a will. The trial
court has viewed the contract as being effective until affirmatively and expressly revoked.
However, the contract specifically states the parties participation in future artificial insemination
procedures is voluntary.
Barbara Krambule argues appellant attempts to find ambiguity in the contract by relying
upon paragraph 8 of the Agreement. (Appellee's Brief pg. 16). She state states in her appeal
brief Appellant wishes to interpret this as requiring ongoing consent and, therefore, Appellee had
a duty to inform the appellant that she was continuing with the procedures after separation.
Neither the interpretation nor the conclusion drawn by Appellant therefrom are tenable.
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(Appellee's Brief, pg. 16)
A reasonable interpretation of the contract is that it requires Appellant's ongoing consent
to future artificial insemination procedures by Barbara Krambule and that both parties continue
to affirm a desire to achieve pregnancy through artificial insemination procedures. Further, that
both parties acknowledge and honor that the other's participation is voluntary to future
insemination procedures.
A contractual provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other facial deficiencies.
Winegar vs. Froerer Corp.. 817 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). A motion for summary judgment
may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and
there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended. Faulkner vs. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983). When ambiguity does exist, the intent of the parties is a question of fact to be
determined by a jury. Colonial Leasing Co. Vs. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co.. 731 P.2d 483, 488
(Utah 1986).
If a contract is ambiguous, the court may consider the parties action and performance as
evidence of the parties true intention. Plateau Min. vs. Utah Div. Of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720,
725 (Utah 1990). Failure to resolve an ambiguity by determining the parties intent from parol
evidence is error. Wingegar vs. Smith. Inv.. Co.. 590 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1979).
Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided if parol evidence may be
admitted. Faulkner vs. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d at 1293.
The court should first examine the language of
the instruments and accord to it the weight and
effect which it may show was intended and if
the meaning is ambiguous or uncertain then
14

consider parol evidence of the parties intention.
665P.2datl293.
In this case we have a hint of the parol evidence if the trial court had heard it as we know
from Findings of Fact 9, in support of the Modified Decree of Divorce that Barbara Krambule
told Rick Krambule and his sister that she only wanted the Krambule name from him and nothing
further; that she carefully considered her decision to make no claims for Mathew and that she
was represented by counsel; and that she allowed the Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce to
be entered without a support order for Mathew. Barbara Krambule's subsequent actions and
conduct indicate she did not expect nor intend Rick Krambule to be legally responsible for
Mathew having concealed her efforts to become pregnant.

V
WHETHER BARBARA KRAMBULE
BREACHED HER DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING BY FAILING TO
NOTIFY RICK KRAMBULE OF HER
CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
PREGNANCY IS AN ISSUE TO BE
DETERMINED AT TRIAL
In light of the trial court's specific ruling that Rick Krambule is not the biological father
of the child, the trial court relied solely on the artificial insemination contract as a basis for its
ruling Rick Krambule is the legal father of Matthew. Rick Krambule argued at the hearing on
his Motion for Summary Judgment he had no knowledge Barbara Krambule was continuing to
undergo artificial insemination procedures after the parties' separated. Prior to oral arguments on
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motion for summary judgment, the trial court acknowledged Rick Krambule's knowledge of
Barbara Krambule's continuing to undergo artificial insemination procedures was a disputed fact
(1/21/98 Tr. at 7). Counsel for Barbara Krambule even acknowledged there existed disputed
material facts in this case. (1/21/98 Tr. at 24, 25)
The purpose, intention, and expectations of the parties should be determined by
considering the contract language and the course of dealings between the parties. In attempting
to become pregnant after separation, Barbara Krambule did not proceed in a manner consistent
with the purpose and intent of the contract, nor the justified expectations of the parties. Failing
to inform Rick Krambule of her continued efforts to become pregnant after separation was a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with him.

VI
BARBARA KRAMBULE ENGAGED
IN CONDUCT WHICH WOULD
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL,
RES JUDICATA, OR WAIVER
The parties were divorced on April 6, 1992 and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Decree of Divorce were entered signed approved as to form by Barbara Krambule's attorney.
The Findings, Conclusions, and Decree of Divorce provide for the custody, child support, and
visitation for Stephanie Krambule and indicate only one child had been born of issue of the
parties marriage, Stephanie Krambule, date of birth January 29, 1985.
Clearly, Barbara Krambule knew she was pregnant and that conception took place on
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June 23, 1991 (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, page 18). Her attorney's letter states she will not
sign a Stipulation unless it provides for the support of her expected child. Nevertheless, Barbara
Krambule and her attorney signed the Stipulation and her attorney approved as to form the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. The divorce was entered on April
6, 1992 after Matthew was born on March 24, 1992.
Barbara Krambule in her Answer to Rick Krambule's Complaint for divorce filed on
September 9, 1991 failed to address the issue of Mathew nor did she in her Counterclaim.
Barbara Krambule knew she had conceived in July, 1991 (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg.
18).
Barbara Krambule and her attorney knowingly permitted the Court to enter an Order
which provided that one child was born of issue of their marriage. Over four (4) years elapsed
before Barbara Krambule claimed Rick Krambule was legally responsible for Matthew Krambule
when she filed a Petition to Modify Decree on July 10, 1996.
Barbara Krambule does not claim that she ever filed a Motion to Set Aside the Decree of
Divorce under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure alleging mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. Furthermore,
Barbara Krambule did not file an independent action for fraud after the Decree of Divorce was
entered. Her actions after the divorce proceedings speak of someone who intentionally did not
desire to assert any contractual rights under the artificial insemination contract.
Estoppel. Rick Krambule argues that Barbara Krambule should be estopped from
asserting a contractual claim against him declaring him to be the legal father of Mathew.
Estoppel requires proof of three elements:
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(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to
act by one party inconsistent with a laterasserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable
action or inaction based upon the first party's
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and
(3) injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate its statement, admission, act, or
failure to act." See State vs. Irizaary. 893 P.2d
1107,1109-1110
Equitable estoppel is only invoked when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise
perpetrate a fraud or unfair advantage. Master vs. Worsley. 777 P2d. 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989).
To establish fraud, a party must demonstrate that a
party made a false representation concerning a presently
existing material fact, which the representor either knew
to be false or made recklessly without sufficient knowledge,
or omitted a material fact when there was a duty to disclose.
for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other
party, with actual, justifiable reliance, resulting in damage
to that other party. See 502 P.2d at 501, 502.
In this case, Barbara Krambule did not disclose to Rick Krambule her efforts to become
pregnant after their separation. She had a duty to disclose to him that fact and thereby induced
him not to take any action resulting in damage to him now in the form of her claim for paternity.
She also intentionally and with the assistance of counsel did not make a contested issue of the
legal responsibility for Mathew requesting instead payment of alimony and college expenses. The
trial court ruled Rick Krambule was the legal father of Mathew because he failed to expressly
revoke his consent to the University Medical Center. Barbara Krambule's action in failing to
disclose her continuing efforts to become pregnant constitutes fraud or unfair advantage in the
context of this case.
Waiver. Waiver requires that there be an existing right, benefit, or advantage; knowledge
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of its existence; and intention to relinquish it. Master vs. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App.
1989) In this case, Barbara Krambule knew of her contractual rights under the artificial
insemination contract and by her conduct expressed an intention to relinquish those rights by
allowing the decree of divorce to be entered, and by signing a Stipulation after her attorney wrote
a letter she intended to make support of Mathew an issue in the divorce proceedings.
Res Judicata. Barbara Krambule specifically agreed, with the concurrence of her
attorney, to Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce which stated one child, Stephanie, had been
born of issue of their marriage. Barbara Krambule made an issue of determination of Rick
Krambule's legal responsibility to Mathew by her attorney's letter dated December 3, 1991. The
contractual claim for the determination regarding Mathew could have and should have been
addressed but Barbara Krambule chose not to litigate. It is submitted Barbara Krambule opted
for alimony and payment of college expenses after initially making Mathew's support an issue in
the divorce proceedings.

VII
ARGUMENTS THAT PUBLIC POLICY
FOR THE SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
PRECLUDE ANY ACT OF BARBARA
KRAMBULE TO DEFEAT THE MINOR
CHILD'S RIGHT OF SUPPORT IS NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS
CASE
It is agreed that strong public policy expressions of concern for the support of minor
children has long been a part of Utah law. However, there is a distinction between support of
children by an acknowledged father and determination of paternity pursuant to a contract.
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Barbara Krambule cites Gullev vs. Gullev. 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977) for holding that
every parent has the inalienable duty to support their children and cannot rid themselves of it.
However, Gullev is not on point in this case because the issue is whether Rick Krambule is a
parent of Mathew.
Estoppel. Barbara Krambule cites the case of Department of Human Services vs. Irizarrv,
893 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1995) stating the Irizarry Court upheld the application of estoppel to
prevent a parent from seeking reimbursement of child support already furnished but explicitly
rejected its application to ongoing child support. However, the Irizaary Court was not concerned
with determination of parentage but rather an issue of reimbursement of child support. Mr.
Irizaary acknowledged his paternity by stipulation shortly after the Complaint was filed by the
State of Utah on behalf of the mother of the twin girls. See 893 P.2d at 1108. Rick Krambule has
not acknowledged he is the father of Mathew and adamantly refutes that contention. Appellant,
Rick Krambule, cited Irizaary, and several other cases in his brief to establish the general
elements of estoppel and why the doctrine of estoppel should bar Barbara Krambule contractual
claim under the insemination contract. Appellant is not asking the Court to overrule Irizaary
but only apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to Barbara Krambule's contract claim for
determination of paternity.
Res Judicata. Barbara Krambule again cites the Irizaary case for the holding it forecloses
any legal or equitable doctrine from defeating a claim for ongoing child support. She also cites
Hills vs. Hills. 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981) which held the rights of minor children cannot be
bartered away, extinguished, estopped, or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the
parties. The Hills case involved an acknowledged father of minor children entering into an
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agreement which terminated his obligation of child support. Neither Irizarrv nor Hills has any
application to this case as the issue is paternity not child support.
Waiver. Barbara Krambule cites Gates vs. Gates. 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990) for
holding that assertion of contractual theories is not applicable to defeat an increase in child
support. In Gates, the husband did not dispute he was the father of the child, however he relied
upon contractual defenses to an attempt by his former wife to increase his child support. The
Gates case is not on point in this instant case as waiver is a defense to an action based on
contract.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's grant of summary judgment and Modification of Decree of Divorce
should be overturned. Barbara Krambule has not supported her motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56(c) URCP. There remains disputed issues of material fact and summary judgment
is not appropriate on the issue of the trial court's interpretation of the contract and considering
the intent of the parties. Also, there exists issues which cannot be decided by summary judgment
as to whether Barbara Krambule breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
under their contact; and also to whether Barbara Krambule is estopped by her conduct, and
whether she has waived contractual rights or is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
DATED this _37_ day of July, 1999.

ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant
Ricky D. Krambule
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief
of Appellant Ricky D. Krambule to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Appellee, Barbara R.
Krambule, Key Bank Bldg., Suite 200,2491 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, this D >
day of July, 1999.

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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